

## THE WORLD

## COLD WAR

## How Nice Must We Be to Nikita?

The U.S. and Britain are often accused, particularly in Bonn, of "running after Khrushchev." For a while last week it looked more as if Khrushchev were running after the West.

The Russian press duly blasted Kennedy's announcement that the U.S. will resume nuclear tests in the atmosphere (see THE NATION), and there were some local harassments in Berlin. But after a secret conference with East Germany's Walter Ulbricht, a Khrushchev communiqué omitted the standard polemics, contained only a mild mention of Berlin and West Germany as topics on the agenda. Meanwhile, Khrushchev kept trying to lure various heads of state to Geneva next week so that the 18-nation disarmament talks would, in his chummy phrase, "start in the right direction." No major power succumbed, but both the U.S. and Britain warmed slightly to the notion of a summit meeting, possibly in June, if preliminary discussion promises a worthwhile climb.

In pressing so hard for a summit, Khrushchev was possibly guilty of another offense often charged against the West—paying too much attention to world opinion.

**Don't Push.** In addition to demonstrating once again Russia's "peaceful intentions" Khrushchev was obviously also attempting to soften up the West and extort some real concessions. The West's response depended in part on how Western statesmen evaluate a theory about Khrushchev that has gained wide acceptance, particularly in Britain. Its advocates make the case that Nikita Khrushchev is the most reasonable of all Russian leaders and "the West's best friend in Moscow." Therefore, they maintain, the Allies should try hard to reach an accord with him.

By accommodating Nikita, the argument goes, the West would strengthen Khrushchev's hand against the still powerful Stalinists, who, with the Chinese Communists, still cling to the Marxist dogma that war between the two systems is inevitable. If, on the other hand, the West pushes Khrushchev too hard, he might fall, and a Stalinist or "Chinese" successor might be far tougher to deal with. In effect, this theory is a political version of Hilaire Belloc's cautionary verse:

*Always keep a-hold of Nurse*

*For fear of finding something worse.*

**Nuclear Reality.** If the U.S. were to act on this advice, no one would be better served than Nikita Khrushchev, who has

often deliberately spread it in the West. Example: when Russia resumed nuclear tests last September at the very time the conference of unaligned nations met in Belgrade, Khrushchev explained to Tito that the testing decision had been forced on him by the "anti-party group"; Tito promptly passed this excuse along, arguing that Khrushchev must not be criticized lest he get into serious trouble with the "Stalinists." In fact, many experts contend that despite lower-echelon jockeying for power, the Stalinist anti-party group ceased to be a threat to Khrushchev in 1956, that he has used it since merely as a political whipping boy. Thus, to act in order to "save" Khrushchev, says a British diplomat, would be "sheer nonsense and dangerous." Most diplomats and

with Khrushchev, who is 67 and has a heart ailment, in hope that he may be succeeded by a younger, more flexible leader who does not "carry a burden of guilt from the past."

Among possible successors: Dmitry Poliansky, 44, a fast-rising Khrushchev protégé who toured the U.S. in 1960; Aleksandr Shelepin, 43, who came up through the Young Communist League and efficiently destalinized the secret police. Likeliest candidate is still Frol Kozlov, 53, a hard-bitten Central Committee member who deputizes for Khrushchev in his absence and has been mentioned by him as his heir. Even if a successor were not to be more "liberal," some experts guess that he would probably have less prestige and ability. Political Analyst Bertram Wolfe

cites the Natural Law of Dictatorships: "Each successive dictator is likely to be more mediocre than the one before."

Whatever Khrushchev's advantages, the consensus of the best Kremlinologists is to dismiss the whole theory of being nice to Nikita for fear of "something worse." Says M.I.T.'s Herbert Ritvo: "The more changes in the Kremlin leadership, the more unstable the situation, the better for us."



KHRUSHCHEV INSPECTING RUSSIAN FACTORY  
Could nurse be worse?

Kremlinologists agree, furthermore, that in some ways Khrushchev has proved a more imaginative adversary than Stalin, and that his retreat from the inevitable-war theory is merely a pragmatic adjustment to nuclear reality. "With a friend like Khrushchev in the U.S.S.R.," says Philosopher Sidney Hook, "the West needs no enemy."

Even if the West could influence Kremlin politics, which is doubtful, it can be argued that the non-Communist world has more to gain from Khrushchev's downfall than from his survival in office. Some experts believe that a prolonged power struggle in the Kremlin might make the militant Chinese more influential in the Red bloc, but few believe that any significant Kremlin faction would be more warlike than Khrushchev.

**Law of Dictatorships.** A top British Kremlinologist goes farther, says that there is little danger and great potential advantage in dragging out negotiations

lized version reflecting the muscle and emotion of a strong, reborn nation.

The new nationalism is based in part on a nagging suspicion that West Germany will be the loser in a cold-war settlement between the U.S. and Moscow; the fear is of a deal with Moscow that would reduce West Berlin's ties to West Germany, and permanently recognize Red rule in East Germany. With this in mind, so stalwart a supporter of the West as former Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano (now Christian Democratic leader in Parliament) recently reminded the Allies sharply that "it is intolerable to offer additional concessions. The aim of talks must be to convince the Soviet Union that the German people have an in-eradicable right to self-determination."

In West Germany's rising chorus of protesting voices, none is more vehement than that of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer himself. These days, he makes no secret of his deep dissatisfaction with Western



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DEFENSE MINISTER STRAUSS  
They mean to be heard.

leadership. *Der Alte* urged the U.S., through visiting Attorney General Robert Kennedy, to limit the scope of this month's 18-nation disarmament talks in Geneva; he fears East and West will start bargaining over Germany if the discussion of disarmament bogs down. If a deal emerged, it could mean some form of East-West "disengagement," which might well permanently prevent the Germans from getting nuclear weapons, or even the long-range rockets capable of carrying them.

**To the Fourth Power.** Impetus for Adenauer's arguments is provided by aggressive Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss, who demands that NATO become a "fourth atomic power"; this obviously would make West Germany an atomic power as well, for despite NATO's control over them, nuclear warheads would be in the hands of the Bundeswehr. Most of the American nuclear weapons on the Continent are already on West German soil but under strict U.S. control.

Washington was angered last week by a blistering attack on U.S. defense policy written by Colonel Gerd Schmückle, Strauss's press secretary. Wrote Schmückle in the conservative weekly *Christ und Welt*: "There are still people in the West who talk of conventional warfare, pauses, rollbacks, escalation and the like . . . Since both sides have atomic weapons, the idea of a conventional war in Europe is military alchemy." Schmückle's conclusion: Western troops, including West Germans, should be prepared to fight it out with superbombs.

**Voice of the Church.** Many West Germans do not share Strauss's desire for the Bomb, but there is a rising clamor in many quarters for a more "active" foreign policy in Bonn. Adenauer's Free Democratic coalition partners, led by Erich Mende, constantly press the government to be more independent. And recently a memorandum approved by top leaders of

Germany's Protestant church took a similar line: "The foreign policy of the government appears to us too one-sidedly defensive . . . We expect our Western Allies to assume the risk of a nuclear war in order to defend West Berlin's freedom" and to reunify divided Germany.

The spokesmen of the "new nationalism" have many faces. Most, like Adenauer and Strauss, are firm advocates of a strong Atlantic alliance and argue that they are merely trying to strengthen it. Others are more concerned with German unity. They would reject nuclear armament and would make other concessions to Russia for the sake of reunification. Off on another tangent is brash Hans Kroll, West Germany's ambassador in Moscow, whose loud advocacy of rapprochement with Russia last fall earned him a personal dressing down from Adenauer himself. Last week Kroll was again ordered home by the angry Chancellor, following press reports that in private talks he had been urging an astonishing array of concessions to Russia, among them a demilitarized West Berlin, admission of both East and West Germany to the United Nations, and a \$2½ billion West German credit to help the Soviet economy.

Few Germans would accept such a scheme, which is far closer to the old spirit of Rapallo than to the New Nationalism. But the Berlin stalemate tends to stifle West Germany's spirit, restricts its activities in other fields; the resulting irritation forces many to the conclusion that something must be done, though no one knows quite what. The fact that the West Germans are even considering "direct" talks with Russia reflects a significant psychological shift. It will require some getting used to by West Germany's allies, but it is not necessarily dangerous to Western unity. As *TIME*'s Bonn bureau sums up: "The new German nationalism is born not only of cold war fears and hopes, but also of the simple fact that West Germany is militarily and economically the most

powerful nation of Western Europe, the second most powerful of the Atlantic alliance. With this to back them up, the West Germans are raising their voice, and they mean to be heard."

## ALGERIA


### The Big Day

"This is a big day," said hefty M'hamed Yazid, the F.L.N. Information Minister, and then he added: "It's my wedding anniversary."

Yazid's mild jest did not obscure the real importance of the occasion. In a single night he had driven 500 miles to Tunis from the Libyan capital of Tripoli, where the Algerian National Revolutionary Council had been in session, to tell waiting newsmen of the cease-fire agreement with France. By an overwhelming vote, the council empowered Premier Ben-youssef Benkhedda to conclude the agreement as he saw fit, without the need of obtaining further council approval.

Still, a few irritating details remained to be settled: 1) the F.L.N. is reluctant to give guarantees of safety to some of the more notorious European leaders in the terrorist Secret Army Organization, 2) the F.L.N. wants a firm, detailed timetable on the French agreement to evacuate its army from Algeria within three years, 3) both sides must agree on the Moslem-European membership of the twelve-man Provisional Executive, which will temporarily govern Algeria.

**A Casual Stroll.** These final hurdles would undoubtedly be overcome this week at yet another meeting of the weary negotiation teams, headed by F.L.N. Vice Premier Belkacem Krim and De Gaulle's Algerian Affairs Minister Louis Joxe. But the daily bloodbath in Algeria mocked the long-delayed promise of peace. The death toll in 1962 has mounted to 1,400. In Algiers, Moslem gunmen shot dead a taxi driver known to be an S.A.O. leader. Within 15 minutes, bands of S.A.O. killers



MURDERED MOSLEM ON ALGIERS' RUE MICHELET  
The bloodbath mocked the promise.